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Using a comprehensive sample of equity-linked private securities offerings by Korean firms from 1989 
to 2000, we examine whether such offerings can be used as a mechanism for wealth transfer between 
issuers and acquirers. For deals involving issuers and acquirers in the same business group (chaebol), the 
announcement returns for chaebol-affiliated issuers with good past performance are lower than those for 
other types of issuers if the price discount is larger. In contrast, this deal leads to more value creation for 
chaebol-affiliated acquirers than other types of acquirers. Furthermore, well-performing chaebol-
affiliated acquirers experience a larger wealth loss than other types of acquirers if they buy securities 
from poorly performing issuers in the same chaebol. We also find that chaebol firms with good past 
performance tend to sell private securities at a low price to their member firms. This evidence is 
consistent with tunneling within business groups. 
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The widespread use of pyramid ownership structures and cross-holdings among firms belonging 
to a business group allows controlling shareholders to exercise full control over a firm despite 
holding a relatively small portion of its cash flow rights.
1    This divergence between ownership and 
control raises concerns of tunneling – that controlling shareholders of the business group have 
strong incentives to siphon resources out of firms to increase their wealth (Johnson, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000). Although tunneling creates a severe agency problem 
between controlling and minority shareholders and imposes a serious friction on the efficient 
functioning of a capital market, systematic evidence of its existence is scarce. One notable 
exception is the study of Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002), who use a sample of 18,600 
Indian firms during the period 1989 to 1999 to examine tunneling in pyramidal ownership structures 
of business groups. They show that the ultimate owners of the pyramids have strong incentives to 
divert resources from firms low down in the pyramid towards ones high up in the pyramid. In a 
similar vein, Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002) find that minority shareholders of firms within the top 30 
Korean business groups typically lose out from their acquisitions, but that the controlling 
shareholders gain from the same deals. These results are consistent with the existence of tunneling 
among firms belonging to business groups. 
In this paper, we extend this literature by providing direct evidence of tunneling among group 
firms. To gain a better understanding of tunneling from a different perspective than those found in 
the existing literature, we analyze the valuation effect and the pricing of equity-linked private 
securities offerings by Korean firms from 1989 to 2000. Our objective is to examine the extent to 
which firm value is related to the controlling shareholder’s incentive to carry out tunneling. Unlike 
previous studies, we focus on the financing decisions of group-affiliated firms, not on their 
investment decisions. We study the private financing activities of group firms because they 
represent a setting where interests of controlling and minority shareholders frequently diverge; thus, 
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tunneling could be a major motivation behind some of these activities. To the extent that tunneling 
takes place in a subtle way and is hard to detect, our focus on private issues also increases the 
possibility of detecting the relation between tunneling and firm value. For example, private issues 
tend to draw less attention from stock market investors and regulatory agencies because they 
essentially view such issues as a private matter. Therefore, the incentive for controlling shareholders 
to tunnel tends to increase with these issues, which makes the tests for exploring the extent of 
tunneling activity around private securities offerings more powerful and convincing. Private 
securities offerings (PSOs) can also involve several interesting forms of tunneling, such as dilutive 
share issues that discriminate against minority shareholders, deep discount issues to benefit 
controlling shareholders, issuing securities at inflated prices by poorly performing firms to well-
performing firms in the same group, etc.
2    This variety provides a rich setting for the investigation 
of the market’s ex-ante valuation of the financing decisions motivated by tunneling. 
The issuance of bonds with warrants (BWs) by Samsung SDS, the Samsung Group’s systems 
integration unit, to the controlling shareholder’s family illustrates how tunneling takes place 
between the member firm and the controlling shareholder. Samsung SDS was an unlisted company, 
but its shares were traded in the over-the-counter market. In February 1999, Samsung SDS issued 
23 billion Korean won worth of BWs through a private placement to Chairman Lee Kun-Hee’s son, 
Lee Jae-Yong, and several others. The BWs, which carry an 8 percent interest and mature in three 
years, give holders the right to convert them into 2.3 million shares of common stock at a price of 
7,150 won per share, one year from the date of issuance. This conversion price was far lower than 
the share price of 54,750 won at the over-the-counter market. Activists for the rights of minority 
shareholders criticized Samsung SDS for selling its new BWs to Lee Jae-Yong in a bid to help him 
gain managerial control after the company goes public, running counter to the interests of other 
shareholders (Korea Herald, June 5, 1999 and May 10, 2000).
3  
 2  
We focus on Korean firms since they have certain characteristics that make them particularly 
well suited to an investigation of tunneling. In particular, many Korean firms belong to business 
groups known as chaebols. An important feature of a chaebol is that it has an inherently weak 
governance structure 
4 and that a single family usually controls all firms in it. Firms belonging to a 
chaebol also maintain substantial business ties with other firms in the group, are bound together by 
a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, and are connected by an extensive arrangement of 
reciprocal shareholding agreements. In general, a chaebol’s owner-managers put up a relatively 
small portion of the total stake in the group, but cross-shareholding among member firms allows 
them to have full control over all member firms. Although having both control rights and ownership 
vested in one individual minimizes the agency problem that arises from the separation of ownership 
and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), it creates another type of agency problem: the owner-
managers of a chaebol can easily expropriate other investors in the firm by tunneling resources out 
of the firm to maximize their welfare (Johnson et al., 2000). These characteristics of chaebol firms 
allow us to examine whether the valuation effect of PSOs is related to tunneling motivated by the 
owner-managers.  
Our paper is also related to the literature that examines the stock-price reaction to PSOs in other 
countries. The existing literature shows convincingly that the announcement of new private equity 
issues by U.S. and Japanese firms is associated with an increase in the firms’ stock price (Wruck, 
1989; Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Kato and Schallheim, 1993; Kang and Stulz, 1996; Barclay, 
Holderness, and Sheehan, 2003).
5   Similarly, there are positive announcement effects for private 
convertible bond issues in contrast to the negative announcement effects for public convertible bond 
issues (Fields and Mais, 1991). Wruck (1989) finds that the change in firm value at the 
announcement of a private sale of equity is strongly correlated with the resulting change in 
ownership concentration, and argues that the positive announcement effect for private equity 
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offerings is largely due to anticipated monitoring by block shareholders. On the other hand, Hertzel 
and Smith (1993) argue that private equity offerings convey information that the issuing firm’s 
equity is undervalued and thus can be used as a solution to mitigate the Myers and Majluf (1984) 
underinvestment problem. While these papers emphasize the positive role of private placements 
either in creating an outside blockholder who monitors management or in resolving asymmetric 
information about firm value, our paper focuses on the dark side of PSOs by studying how firm 
value is affected when the main motivation behind placing securities privately is to transfer 
resources between firms.
6  
We find that PSOs by Korean firms are associated with a positive announcement effect for the 
shareholders of the issuing firms. However, the positive gains are mainly from PSOs by non-
chaebol issuers. Chaebol issuers that sold securities privately to firms in the same group realize 
insignificant announcement returns. Furthermore, for the deals involving issuers and acquirers in 
the same chaebol, the announcement and long-run returns for issuers with good past performance 
are lower than those for other types of issuers if the price discount is larger. In contrast, the same 
deals lead to more value creation for chaebol-affiliated acquirers than other types of acquirers. 
These results suggest that PSOs facilitate a particular form of tunneling in which transfers are made 
from issuers with good performance to acquirers. At the same time, well-performing chaebol-
affiliated acquirers experience a larger wealth loss than other types of acquirers if they buy 
securities from poorly performing issuers in the same chaebol. This result implies that resources can 
also be tunneled into poorly performing issuers out of well-performing acquirers. In addition, we 
find that the announcement returns for issuers are positively related to equity ownership by foreign 
investors, suggesting that foreign investors play an instrumental role in restricting tunneling. 
However, when chaebol firms with concentrated equity ownership by owner-managers sell their 
private securities to other firms in the same group, or when chaebol firms sell these securities at a 
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deep discount to other member firms, the announcement and long-run returns are lower. Further 
analysis shows that our results for issuing firms are mainly driven by the deals in which owner-
managers personally acquire private securities at the offerings rather than the cases in which 
affiliated firms in the same chaebol are involved in the deals. Finally, we find that the chaebol firms 
with good past performance tend to sell private securities at a low price to other member firms in 
the same chaebol. These results are consistent with the existence of tunneling in Korean PSOs. 
Overall, our findings for chaebol-affiliated firms are in contrast to those of previous studies that 
document the positive role of PSOs, and support the tunneling view for business groups. They also 
suggest that the controlling shareholder’s incentive to carry out tunneling should be factored in 
when the value of chaebol-affiliated firms is being evaluated.   
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we develop the testable implications of the 
tunneling view for private placements of securities. Section II describes the data and provides 
summary statistics for important variables. Section III provides the cumulative abnormal returns for 
issuers, acquirers, and portfolios of non-issuing firms in the same chaebol. Section IV reports the 
results from cross-sectional regressions. Section V reports the results from the robustness tests. 
Section VI summarizes and concludes the paper.     
 
I. Testable Implications of the Tunneling View   
Firms that conduct equity-linked PSOs tend to draw less attention from market participants and 
regulatory agencies than do those that conduct public security offerings since they are typically sold 
to a few investors with negotiated terms (Wruck, 1989). Such a loose scrutiny tends to make 
tunneling easier for firms placing securities privately than those placing securities publicly. 
Furthermore, the owner-managers of chaebol-affiliated firms that conduct PSOs have strong 
opportunities to engage in tunneling since the buyers of these securities sometimes belong to the 
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same group. Given that all the major decisions of each member firm in the chaebol are in the hands 
of the controlling family, rather than professional management, and that the legal protection against 
expropriation of minority shareholders was weak in Korea during our sample period, the chaebol’s 
owner-managers may have strong incentives to siphon resources out of the issuers (acquirers) to 
increase their or the acquirers’ (issuers’) wealth. These arguments suggest that deals involving 
issuers and acquirers in the same chaebol have greater potential for affecting firm value than do 
other types of deals. Therefore, the tunneling view predicts that announcement returns of chaebol 
issuers (acquirers) who are more likely to tunnel resources out of the acquirers (issuers) will be 
higher than those of other issuers (acquirers). In contrast, announcement returns of chaebol issuers 
(acquirers) who are more likely to be tunneled will be lower than those of other issuers (acquirers). 
To test these implications of the tunneling view for PSOs, we examine the announcement 
returns of the subsamples of both chaebol issuers and chaebol acquirers who are more likely to 
experience tunneling effects. The wealth transfer is more likely to occur for deals involving issuers 
and acquirers in the same chaebol, especially when issuers with good past performance sell their 
shares to the acquirers at deep discounted prices, or when issuers with poor past performance sell 
their shares to acquirers with good past performance at inflated prices. Ownership structure will 
also certainly have an influence on tunneling activities. Below, we describe more detailed testable 
implications of the tunneling view for different groups of issuers and acquirers. 
First, we investigate private placements of equity by chaebol firms in which shares are sold at a 
low price to either owner-managers or their families. We also examine cases in which chaebol firms 
sell shares at a lower price to firms in the same group. According to the tunneling view, these 
transactions facilitate wealth transfer from the issuers to the acquirers. Therefore, such transactions 
increase the value of chaebol acquirers, but have an adverse effect on the value of issuers in the 
same group.   
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Tunneling can also take place if chaebol firms with good past performance sell their shares at a 
discounted price to firms in the same group. The tunneling view predicts that announcement returns 
of these issuers will be lower than those of other issuers, but announcement returns of chaebol 
acquirers will be higher than those of other acquirers. In contrast, rescue purchases, in which 
chaebol firms that had good performance prior to the issuance buy shares from poorly performing 
issuers in the same chaebol, predict the opposite.   
Private convertible bonds and BWs offerings can be used in a similar way by setting the 
conversion value or strike price very low compared to the current stock price without having the 
deep-in-the-money option value reflected in the price of those securities. 
Ownership structure such as equity ownership by controlling shareholders and equity ownership 
by foreign investors can also play an important role in tunneling activities within firms that belong 
to business groups. A priori, the effect of controlling ownership on firm value is unclear. For 
example, if owner-managers of chaebol firms are more concerned with maximizing their own utility 
or the total value of their chaebol than with maximizing the value of an individual member firm 
(Johnson et al., 2000; Bae et al., 2002), issuing (acquiring) firms where owner-managers own a 
large concentration of shares will have a more severe agency problem and thus are more likely to be 
adversely affected at the time of the issue announcement. In contrast, if concentrated ownership in 
issuing (acquiring) firms by owner-managers minimizes the agency problem that arises from the 
separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and provides fewer incentives for 
owner-managers to transfer resources from issuing (acquiring) firms to acquiring (issuing) firms, it 
could have a positive or neutral effect on the value of issuing (acquiring) firms.   
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), outside ownership can provide incentives for 
shareholders such as foreign investors to monitor managerial performance and take actions that 
enhance firm value. Foreign investors tend to hold equity in a few selected affiliated firms with 
 7  
good performance (Kang and Stulz, 1997), which suggests that they are likely to be victims rather 
than beneficiaries of tunneling if tunneling takes place. Therefore, foreign investors have a strong 
incentive to monitor the chaebol owner-managers and discourage them from engaging in tunneling. 
These arguments suggest that foreign ownership of issuers (acquirers) is positively related to 
abnormal returns for issuers (acquirers). 
We also consider the value-weighted portfolio returns of other firms within the same chaebol in 
the analysis. Since a chaebol can be viewed as a portfolio of firms, PSOs by a member firm have 
the potential to affect the value of both issuing firms and other non-issuing firms in the group. For 
example, if the deal involving a poorly performing issuer and a well-performing acquirer in the 
same chaebol maximizes the aggregate value of the group, then the issue announcement might be 
good news for the other firms in the group, even though it is bad news for the acquiring firm. 
Alternatively, other members of the chaebol might experience increases in value because the market 
expects that if those member firms were to get into trouble, they too would be bailed out (Bae et al., 
2002). However, to the extent that this deal sends bad signals to the market about the quality of the 




Our sample consists of private sales of equity-linked securities by nonfinancial firms listed on 
the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) during the period 1989 to 2000. The types of securities we 
consider include common stock, convertible bonds, and BWs. We obtain our sample by checking 
various sources, including the Korea Securities Research Institute (KSRI)’s database, the Korea 
Listed Companies Association (KLCA)’s database, the KLCA’s monthly publication, Sang Jang, 
KOSCOM’s CHECK2000 database, and the KSE’s Korea Investor’s Network for Disclosure 
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System (KIND System). To avoid having results confounded by multiple issues that cluster during a 
short time period, we eliminate issues that occur within a 10-day interval before and after the 
announcement of the offering. We collect the offering announcement dates from one of the major 
daily economic newspapers, the Korea Economic Daily, a publication that is essentially the Korean 
equivalent of the Wall Street Journal. We obtain the stock price data from the Korea Investor 
Service (KIS)’s KIS 2000 database and financial data from the KLCA and KIS’s FAS2000 
databases. Our restrictions result in a final sample of 262 offerings. 
Since the measure of tunneling within firms belonging to the business group requires stock 
return data, we define a chaebol as the business group that has at least two listed member firms. Our 
definition of a chaebol is much broader than that of other studies where a chaebol is usually defined 
as one of the 30 largest business groups. Since “the top 30” is an arbitrary category that the Korean 
government creates for its own purposes and the issue of tunneling is relevant not only to the large 
business groups but also to other small business groups, our definition of a chaebol allows us to 
measure the tunneling effect more accurately. We identify each firm’s chaebol affiliation using the 
KIS 2000 database. 
Table I reports the distribution of announcements of PSOs by type and by year. Private 
convertible bond offerings (PCBOs) were the most frequent events (149 cases), followed by 60 
cases of private equity offerings (PEOs) and 53 cases of private bonds with warrants offerings 
(PBWOs). While not reported, out of the 262 PSOs, 116 (44.3 percent) were issued by chaebol-
affiliated firms. Out of these 116 issues, 100 were issued by firms belonging to the top 30 chaebols 
and in 77 cases, issuers and acquirers belonged to the same chaebol (hereafter called the “intra-
group deals”). There was some clustering of the issues during the Asian financial crisis. More than 
80 percent of the PEOs, 64 percent of the PCBOs, and all of the PBWOs occurred during the period 
1997 to 2000. For private convertible bonds and private BWs, no offerings were made from 1993 to 
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1996. This was mainly due to the Korean government’s policy of restricting the issuance of private 
equity-linked securities out of concern that these securities were sometimes used against the 
interests of minority shareholders. The Korean government stopped imposing this restriction in 
1997. Except for a period in the early 1990s when PCBOs were popular, PSOs were rare events 
until recently.   
To compare the frequency distribution of the PSOs with that of the public equity offerings, 
Table I also shows the frequency distribution of rights offerings and Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
by year. There were 1,775 rights offerings and 522 IPOs during our sample period. The 
predominance of rights offerings in Korea is not surprising given the findings of Cronqvist and 
Milsson (2003) who show that to avoid the possibility of an increase in monitoring by blockholders, 
firms controlled by a family prefer to use uninsured rights offerings. To examine whether the equity 
issuing activity depends on the market condition as was shown in other markets (Loughran and 
Ritter, 1995), the last column of the table also reports the annual returns of the Korea Composite 
Stock Price Index (KOSPI). Unlike with the U.S. case, we do not observe any significant relation 
between the equity offering activity and the stock market condition.   
[Insert Table  Ⅰ here] 
In Table II, we present the summary statistics of a sample of 262 issuing firms. The average 
offering size for the total sample is 19.9 billion won, with a median of 10 billion won. Although the 
average offering size for a subsample of 77 intra-group deals is larger than that for a subsample of 
185 other deals (25.3 billion won compared to 17.7 billion won), the median offering sizes of these 
two subsamples are the same (10 billion won each).
7   For the total sample, the offering size on 
average accounts for 5.8 percent of total assets. The mean ratios of offering size to total assets for 
intra-group deals and other deals are 7.4 percent and 5.2 percent, respectively. The difference in the 
ratios of offering size to total assets between the two groups is statistically significant. The medians 
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show a similar pattern. The offering size (in terms of both the won amount and relative size to total 
assets) of PEOs is on average greater than that of PCBOs or PBWOs, and these differences are 
more pronounced for intra-group deals.   
[Insert Table  Ⅱ  here] 
For PEOs, we measure the discount as the ratio of the difference between the share price on the 
announcement day and the offer price to share price on the announcement date. For PCBOs 
(PBWOs), we use the conversion price (strike price) instead of the offer price.
8  For the total sample, 
the mean and median discounts are -5.6 percent (i.e., a premium of 5.6 percent) and 4.3 percent, 
respectively. The discounts range from a maximum of 98.8 percent to a minimum of -825.9 percent. 
The fact that the median shows the discount while the mean shows the premium suggests that the 
sample consists largely of issues with a discount, but does include a few cases with a relatively large 
premium. When we exclude the premium of more than 100 percent in the sample, the mean and 
median discounts are 4.7 percent and 5.2 percent, respectively. 
For a subsample of intra-group deals, the mean and median discounts are -14.0 percent and 0.0 
percent, respectively. The corresponding numbers for a subsample of other deals are -2.2 percent 
and 6.9 percent, respectively. The difference in average premium between intra-group deals and 
other deals is statistically significant, suggesting that the deals involving firms in the same chaebol 
tend to carry a higher offer price than other deals.   
The further breakdown of the total sample into PEOs, PCBOs, and PBWOs shows that larger 
premiums for intra-group deals are mainly from PEOs. For PEOs, the mean and median discounts 
for intra-group deals are -26.9 percent and -5.4 percent, respectively. For other deals, the 
corresponding numbers are -10.2 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively. The tests of mean 
differences between these two subgroups strongly reject the null hypothesis of equality.   
Leverage (total debt / total assets) is significantly higher for issuers in intra-group deals than 
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those in other deals. For the total sample, the mean (median) leverage ratios for intra-group deals 
and other deals are 87.7 (78.3) percent and 71.6 (70.4) percent, respectively. The higher leverage 
ratio for intra-group deals is also observed for the subsamples of PEOs, PCBOs, and PBWOs.   
Past performance of the firm, which we measure by the industry-adjusted ratio of net income to 
total assets (ROA), shows that firms privately issuing securities underperform relative to their 
industry peers. The mean and median industry-adjusted ROAs for the total sample are -1.8 percent 
and -0.5 percent, respectively. The mean and median industry-adjusted ROAs for issuers in intra-
group deals are, respectively, -2.0 percent and -0.4 percent, and those for issuers in other deals are, 
respectively, -1.9 percent and -0.6 percent. The tests of median differences between these two 
subgroups strongly reject the null hypothesis of equality. 
The average equity ownership by the controlling shareholder (including the largest shareholder, 
her/his family members, and affiliated firms) for the total sample is about 21.4 percent. Controlling 
ownership is not statistically different between issuers in intra-group deals and those in other deals. 
Equity ownership by foreign investors for the total sample averages 10.8 percent, with a median of 
3.6 percent. The average foreign equity investment is significantly larger for issuers in intra-group 
deals (14.3 percent) than for those in other deals (9.4 percent).   
 
III. Market’s Responses to PSOs 
We calculate the abnormal returns for the issuing and acquiring firms around the time of the 
announcement of private sales of securities by using standard event-study methodology. We 
implement the test procedure by computing ex post abnormal returns as: 
 
) R ˆ ˆ ( R AR β α + − = mt i i it it ,      (1) 
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where Rit and Rmt are the daily return of the firm i at time t and the daily KOSPI return at time t, 
respectively. The coefficients   and  i  are the ordinary least squares estimates of the intercept 
and slope, respectively, of the market model regression. To compute the abnormal returns, we 
estimate the firm-specific parameters   and  i  with an ordinary least squares regression, using 
200 daily returns beginning at day t = -220 and ending at t = -21 relative to the announcement date. 
The daily abnormal return is accumulated to obtain the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from day 
-t before the announcement date to day +t after the announcement date. We use t-statistics to test the 
hypothesis that the average CARs are equal to zero and sign-rank test statistics to test the hypothesis 





We estimate abnormal returns for non-issuing affiliates using the portfolio approach. 
Specifically, we estimate the market-model parameters using the return of the value-weighted 
portfolio of non-issuing firms in the same group. We then estimate the daily abnormal returns of the 
portfolio using the market model parameters and accumulate the daily abnormal returns to obtain 
the portfolio CAR from day -t to day +t.  
Table III presents the CARs for issuing firms. We report the results for the total sample as well 
as the subsamples classified according to the involvement of group-affiliated acquiring firms in the 
deals and the type of securities. The average CAR (-1, 1) and CAR (-5, 5) for the total sample are 
1.88 percent and 2.97 percent, respectively, and significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels. These results 
are consistent with those for U.S. issuers conducting private sales of equity (Wruck, 1989; Hertzel 
and Smith, 1993; Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan, 2003). In contrast, the mean and median CARs 
(-10, 480) are -42.02 percent and -47.91 percent, respectively, both of which are significant at the 
0.01 level. These results are also consistent with the findings of Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees 
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(2002) and Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2003), who show the long-run underperformance 
following private sales of equity by U.S. firms.   
[Insert Table  Ⅲ  here] 
The subsample results show that the significance of the mean CAR (-1, 1) and CAR (-5, 5) 
mostly comes from issuers in other deals. The mean CAR (-1, 1) and CAR (-5, 5) for issuers in 
other deals are 1.90 percent and 3.31 percent, respectively. They are all significant at the 0.05 level. 
Although the average CARs for issuers in intra-group deals during the same intervals are positive, 
they are not significant. Furthermore, the median CAR (-10, 480) for intra-group deals is 
significantly smaller than that for other deals (-71.97 percent compared to -42.88 percent). The fact 
that the short-term CARs for issuers in intra-group deals are not significant and their long-term 
performance is worse than other types of firms conducting private sales of securities suggests that 
factors that determine the valuation effects of the PSOs are different for chaebol and non-chaebol 
firms and that tunneling can be a major motivation behind some chaebol firms’ financing activities.  
To more closely show different patterns of stock price movement for the issuers in intra-group 
deals and those in other deals, in Figure 1 we plot the CARs from day -10 to day +480 around the 
event date. The CARs for the issuers in intra-group deals increase up to day -5 and then start falling 
until day +480. For the issuers in other deals, the CARs also increase before day -5. Unlike the 
CARs for the issuers in intra-group deals, the CARs for the issuers in other deals continue to rise 
even after the announcement date and level off at day +50. The CARs start falling below zero after 
around day +70. 
[Insert FigureⅠhere] 
The classification by the type of securities indicates that firms conducting PEOs experience a 
mean CAR (-1, 1) of 3.92 percent and a mean CAR (-5, 5) of 6.41 percent. Both announcement 
returns are significant at the 0.05 level. The corresponding returns for firms conducting PCBOs and 
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PBWOs, however, are not significant. The CARs (-10, 480) are negative for all three types of 
securities offerings and those for intra-group deals are always smaller than those for other deals. 
Panel A of Table IV reports the returns of purchasing firms around PSO announcement dates. 
For most deals in our sample, there are usually multiple acquirers involved in the sale. In such 
instances, we identify the firm that purchases the largest portion of private securities as the lead 
acquirer. Out of 262 issues, 43 lead acquirers are individuals and 149 lead acquirers are unlisted 
firms, so our return analysis for acquirers is conducted using a sample of 70 listed purchasing firms. 
Among 70 firms, 31 were acquirers in intra-groups deals and 39 were acquirers in other deals. We 
find that the mean CAR (-1, 1) for acquiring firms is 0.72 percent, with a median of -0.83 percent. 
None of these CARs is significant. The breakdown of the sample by the type of securities shows a 
similar pattern. The average and median CARs (-1, 1) for acquirers in the subsamples of PEOs, 
PCBOs, and PBWOs are all small and insignificant. In contrast, the mean and median CARs (-10, 
480) for acquiring firms in the total sample are -37.12 percent and -29.65 percent, respectively, both 
of which are significant. Given that issuing firms experience long-run underperformance following 
private sales of equity-linked securities, the negative long-run returns for acquiring firms may be 
expected since these two groups of firms are linked by securities issued by issuing firms. In other 
words, the stock price change of issuing firms from day -10 to day +480 affects the stock price of 
acquiring firms during the same period via a change in the market value of equity-linked security 
holdings in issuing firms.  
[Insert Table  Ⅳ here] 
Panel A of Table IV also reports the value-weighted portfolio returns of non-issuing firms that 
belong to the same chaebol as the issuer. If the main motivation behind placing securities privately 
by the controlling shareholder is to tunnel resources out of the affiliated firm and transfer them to 
other firms, PSO announcements will have value implications not only to issuing firms but also to 
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other member firms in the same chaebol. Out of our sample of 116 chaebol issuers, 8 do not have 
any listed non-issuing member firms except for the listed purchasing firms. So, our analysis for the 
value-weighted portfolio returns of non-issuing firms is conducted with 108 portfolios. We find that 
the mean CAR (-1, 1) of a value-weighted portfolio is -0.27 percent, with a median of -0.21 percent. 
The mean and median CARs (-5, 5) are -0.87 percent and -0.46 percent and the mean and median 
CARs (-10, 480) are -13.92 percent and -12.95 percent, respectively. These CARs are not 
significant. A similar pattern is observed for the subsamples of the three types of securities offerings. 
In tests not reported here, we also experiment with equally weighted portfolio returns and obtain 
results that are qualitatively similar.   
Panel B of Table IV shows the CARs (-1, 1) for both acquirers and issuers in 70 deals according 
to whether acquirers and issuers belong to the same chaebol or not. The acquiring firms in intra-
group deals realize significant and negative abnormal returns. The mean and median CARs (-1, 1) 
of acquiring firms in intra-group deals are -0.61 percent and -1.05 percent, respectively, both of 
which are significant. The corresponding returns for issuing firms in intra-group deals, however, are 
not significant. In contrast, the returns for acquiring and issuing firms in other deals show an 
opposite pattern. Although the mean and median CARs (-1, 1) of issuing firms are positive and 
significant, 6.56 percent and 0.62 percent, respectively, those of acquiring firms are insignificant. 
These results indicate that the managerial objectives of chaebol firms in intra-group deals are 
different from those of firms in other deals. 
 
IV. Multivariate Analysis 
Given that it is in the interests of the controlling shareholders to tunnel resources in subtle and 
hard-to-detect ways (Bertrand et al., 2002), the relatively small magnitude of the CARs for issuers 
in the intra-group deals and non-issuers in the same chaebol, and the lack of their statistical 
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significance in Tables III and IV may not be surprising. For example, when tunneling is detected 
later by investors or regulatory bodies, the controlling shareholders can receive severe penalties 
from the stock market and face various sanctions from regulators. The controlling shareholders, 
therefore, tend to choose the form of tunneling that minimizes penalties and sanctions and this 
makes the existence of tunneling difficult to detect by the market participants. Alternatively, 
tunneling could take place in both directions, from issuers to acquirers or from acquirers to issuers, 
so the announcement effects of these two opposite forms of tunneling tend to offset each other. To 
avoid the measurement problems associated with the subtlety of tunneling, in this section we further 
identify the subgroups of deals in which tunneling effects are more likely to occur and examine 
whether the announcement effects of these groups are different from those of other groups in the 
multivariate regression framework. 
 
A. Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis for Issuers 
In Table V, we use the CAR (-1, 1) for the issuer as the dependent variable. In tests not reported 
here, we also experiment with CARs (-1, 0) and CARs (-5, 5) and obtain results similar to those 
reported in this paper. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).
9   As a 
measure of tunneling effects, we use the variables discussed in Section I as the independent 
variables: i) equity ownership by the controlling shareholder; ii) equity ownership by foreign 
investors; iii) discount; iv) industry-adjusted ROA; and v) a dummy variable for intra-group deals. 
We further bifurcate intra-group deals into two different subgroups based on whether the securities 
are sold to the owner-managers or other affiliated firms in the same chaebol. To discriminate the 
tunneling effects between intra-group deals and other deals, we interact the dummy variables for 
intra-group deals with the variables related to tunneling as specified above. The regressions also 
control for firm size (log of total assets), leverage (total debt over total assets), size of offerings 
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(offer amount over total assets), industry dummy variables, and dummy variables for the type of 
securities. 
[Insert Table  Ⅴ here] 
In regressions (1) and (2) of Table V, we regress the CARs for issuers on ownership structure, 
discount, industry-adjusted ROA, the dummy for intra-group deals, and other control variables. The 
CARs display a strong negative association with the private placement discount. Given that the 
wealth transfer from issuers to purchasers is more likely to occur if the discount is larger, this result 
is consistent with the tunneling view. We also find that the coefficient on equity ownership by 
foreign investors is positive and significant at the 0.10 level. To the extent that foreign investors are 
independent from management, this result supports the view that unaffiliated outside investors play 
an instrumental role in preventing firms from engaging in tunneling activities. The coefficient on 
the industry-adjusted ROA, however, is not significant. A potential explanation for the 
insignificance of issuers’ past performance is that firm performance can have two offsetting effects 
on announcement returns. First of all, a poor performance of issuing firms can increase the 
possibility of tunneling from purchasers to issuers. At the same time, however, it can also 
deteriorate issue terms of PSOs because poorly performing firms would have more difficulty in 
obtaining external financing. Equity ownership by the controlling shareholder is positively related 
to the CARs, suggesting that firms with higher ownership concentration by owner-managers are 
more likely to undertake value-increasing actions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
To further examine the role of controlling ownership in intra-group deals, in regression (3), we 
add an interaction term between the controlling ownership and the intra-group deal dummy. The 
coefficient on equity ownership by the controlling shareholder is positive and significant at the 5% 
significance level, suggesting that among issuers in other deals, larger controlling ownership 
generally leads to more significant increases in the announcement returns. The coefficient on the 
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interaction variable, however, is negative and significant at the 5% significance level. This result 
indicates that relative to other issues, the market reacts negatively to issue announcements of intra-
group deals in which owner-mangers of issuing firms have concentrated equity ownership. Taken 
together, these results suggest that the positive relation between equity ownership by the controlling 
shareholder and the CARs for the total sample is mainly driven by the subsample of other deals. To 
the extent that concentrated ownership by owner-managers makes it easier for them to engage in 
tunneling within a business group, our results for intra-group deals support the tunneling view. 
In the fourth regression, we add an additional interaction term between the discount rate and the 
intra-group deal dummy. If the issuing firms sell securities at a deep discount for tunneling purposes 
to firms in the same chaebol, we would expect a negative relation between the CAR for the issuing 
firms and this interaction term. Consistent with our expectation, the interaction variable has a 
coefficient of -0.037 with a t-statistic of -1.95. In contrast, the coefficient on the discount rate is -
0.003 and not significant. Therefore, unlike intra-group deals, the discount has little statistically 
discernible effect on the CAR for the issuing firms in other deals.     
The next regression further confirms the importance of controlling ownership and discount 
variables in explaining the CAR for the issuing firms in the intra-group deals. In this regression, we 
use an interaction term between the discount and the indicator variable for intra-group deals in 
which the controlling shareholder of issuing firms has equity ownership above the sample median. 
The coefficient on this term is significantly negative, indicating that issuing firms that sell securities 
to the firms in the same group suffer more when discounts as well as controlling ownership are 
larger. 
To investigate the joint impact of private placement discounts and the past performance of 
issuing firms on announcement returns, in the sixth regression, we use an interaction term between 
the discount rate and the indicator variable for intra-group deals in which issuing firms have an 
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industry-adjusted ROA above the sample median. We expect that tunneling is more likely to occur 
from issuers to acquirers if the issuers with good past performance sell securities at a lower price to 
the firms in the same chaebol. Consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficient on the interaction term 
is significantly negative with a t-statistic of -2.29.   
To understand the circumstances under which tunneling effects of controlling ownership and 
discount rates are more detrimental, in regression (7), we examine whether the results for intra-
group deals vary across those in which securities are sold to the owner-managers and those in which 
they are sold to the firms in the same chaebol. We use four interaction terms: the interaction term 
between the controlling ownership and the dummy variable for sales to the owner-manager, the 
interaction term between the controlling ownership and the dummy variable for sales to the 
affiliated firms, the interaction term between the discount rate and the dummy variable for sales to 
the owner-manager, and the interaction term between the discount rate and the dummy variable for 
sales to the affiliated firms. The results show that only the coefficients of the interaction variables 
involving sales to the owner-manager are significant and negative. These results suggest that the 
presence of owner-managers in person in the intra-group deals prompts more negative reaction from 
the stock market. 
Among other control variables, firm size is significantly and negatively related to the 
announcement period returns. To the extent that large issuing firms have more resources and play a 
key role in tunneling resources, the negative coefficient on firm size is consistent with the tunneling 
effect. 
Overall, our results support the view that chaebol owner-managers with high concentrated 
ownership are likely to be involved in inefficient corporate transactions. These results support the 
existence of tunneling effects in firms belonging to business groups in emerging markets. 
However, one obvious issue in using pooled data of private placements of equity, convertible 
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bonds, and BWs is that, as is shown in Table II, issue and issuer characteristics of these three groups 
are somewhat different from each other and therefore our results in Table V could be driven by a 
particular group of sample firms even though we have controlled the types of security offerings by 
including dummy variables. To ensure that this is not the case, we re-estimate the regressions by the 
type of securities offerings. Since the subsample of PBWOs includes only seven cases of intra-
group deals, we do not perform the regression analysis for this subsample.   
The regression estimates for the subgroups are reported in Table VI. For the subsample of firms 
conducting private equity offerings, the CARs (-1, 1) for issuing firms are negatively related to both 
the interaction term between the discount and the intra-group deal dummy, and the interaction term 
between the discount and the indicator variable for intra-group deals in which the controlling 
shareholder of issuing firms has equity ownership above the sample median. On the other hand, for 
the subsample of private convertible placements, the coefficients on the interaction term between 
the controlling ownership and the intra-group deal dummy (particularly the deal involving owner-
managers), and the interaction term between the discount and the indicator variable for well-
performing issuing firms in intra-group deals are negative and highly significant.
10 Although the 
results for these two subgroups are not exactly the same as those for the total sample, they are 
consistent with the tunneling view and suggest that our main results regarding the tunneling effect 
are not specific to a certain group of firms. 
[Insert Table  Ⅵ here] 
 
B. Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis for Acquirers and the Value-weighted Portfolio of Non-
issuing Chaebol Firms 
To more closely examine the existence of tunneling effects, we examine whether financial and 
ownership structure of issuing firms have any impacts on the cross-sectional variation of abnormal 
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returns for purchasing firms and non-issuing firms that belong to the same chaebol as the issuer.   
In Table VII, we use the CAR (-1, 1) for the lead acquirer as the dependent variable. In addition 
to the independent variables used in Table V, we include acquirers’ financial characteristics such as 
industry-adjusted ROA, equity ownership by issuers in acquiring firms, firm size, and leverage as 
explanatory variables. To capture the tunneling from acquirers to issuers, we also include a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if bad issuers (issuers with industry-adjusted ROAs below the 
sample median) sell securities privately to good acquirers (acquirers with industry-adjusted ROAs 
above the sample median). 
[Insert Table  Ⅶ here] 
The most important finding from Table VII is that the coefficient estimate on an interaction 
term between the discount rate and the indicator variable for intra-group deals in which issuing 
firms have industry-adjusted ROAs above the sample median is 0.250 (t-statistic = 2.05) for 
acquirers. This finding, coupled with the finding that the coefficient on the same variable is negative 
and significant in the previous regression for the issuers, suggests the possibility of the wealth 
transfer from the issuing firms with good past performance to the acquiring firms. Along the same 
line, the coefficient estimate on the interactive dummy variables of the intra-group deal dummy and 
the bad issuer / good acquirer dummy is -0.119 with a t-statistic of -1.86. Since this result means 
that acquirers with good performance experience a larger wealth loss than other types of acquirers if 
they buy securities from poorly performing issuers in the same chaebol, it implies that resources can 
also be tunneled into poorly performing issuers out of well-performing acquirers.   
However, the coefficients on the other two interaction variables – an interaction term between 
the discount and the intra-group deal dummy, and an interaction term between the discount and the 
indicator variable for intra-group deals in which the controlling shareholder of issuing firms has 
equity ownership above the sample median – turn out to be negative. These results are inconsistent 
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with the tunneling view. The tunneling hypothesis predicts these interaction variables to be positive. 
A possible explanation for the negative coefficients is that the sample used in the regressions of 
Table VII consists only of listed firms and does not include chaebol owner-managers who 
personally acquire private securities from issuers. Since the previous regression of Table V shows 
that the tunneling effects of discount and controlling ownership variables in intra-group deals are 
pronounced only when chaebol owner-managers are buyers of private securities, the coefficients on 
these two interaction variables in Table VII are estimated less precisely.   
Further findings from Table VII are that the CARs for acquirers are positively and significantly 
related to the issuing firm’s controlling ownership, industry-adjusted ROA, and discount. These 
results are consistent with the tunneling hypothesis because acquiring firms are more likely to get 
benefits when they purchase securities privately from firms with concentrated controlling 
ownership, those with good past performance, and those selling securities at a significant discount.   
Regarding the acquirers’ characteristics, equity ownership by issuers in acquirers is 
significantly negative. This result is also consistent with the tunneling view since issuing firms with 
a larger ownership stake in acquiring firms can exercise more influence on acquiring firms to 
engage in purchases of private securities at less favorable terms.     
In summary, the results of Table VII are generally consistent with those of Table V and further 
confirm the importance of tunneling in determining firm values during the period of private 
placements of securities.   
Table VIII shows the results from regressing the value-weighted portfolio CAR (-1, 1) of non-
issuing firms on the issue and issuer characteristics used in Table V. The results show that CARs (-1, 
1) are negatively and significantly related to an issuer’s controlling ownership and discount. The 
coefficient on the discount is significantly more negative for intra-group deals, particularly when an 
issuer’s industry-adjusted ROA is above the sample median. We also find that for intra-group deals, 
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the effect of the private placement discount on the value of non-issuing firms is more detrimental 
when owner-managers of the chaebol are personally involved in the private placement transactions. 
Overall, the results for non-issuing firms are similar to those for issuing firms, suggesting that for 
intra-group deals, the factors that affect the shareholder wealth of issuing firms also affect the 
shareholder wealth of non-issuing affiliated firms in the same direction. Taken together, our results 
indicate that the market perceives private placements of securities by a chaebol-affiliated firm as 
group-wide events, so investors expect that if non-issuing member firms were to get involved in 
private placement of securities, they too would become either the victims or beneficiaries of 
tunneling as in the case of issuers. 
[Insert Table Ⅷ here] 
In sum, the results from the multivariate analyses of announcement period returns for issuers, 
acquirers, and non-issuing firms in the same chaebol support the tunneling view that the chaebol 
owner-managers make financing decisions with little regard for maximizing the shareholder wealth 
of the individual firm, but with great regard for maximizing their own private benefits or the value 
of the whole group. 
 
V. Additional Tests 
To determine if the cross-sectional variation of issuer returns is robust to the period during 
which cumulative abnormal returns are calculated, we use as the dependent variable the long-run 
(days -10 to 480) returns of issuing firms instead of short-run (days -1 to 1) announcement returns 
and report the results in Table IX. The results indicate that our findings for the regressions of the 
CARs (-1, 1) mirror those of the CARs (-10, 480). The sign and significance of the coefficients on 
all interaction terms involving the dummy for intra-group deals remain about the same except for an 
interaction term between the discount rate and the indicator variable for intra-group deals in which 
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the controlling shareholder of issuing firms has equity ownership above the sample median. 
Although the coefficient on this interaction variable has a predicted sign, it is not significant. 
[Insert Table  Ⅸ here] 
An alternative way to show the extent of tunneling within firms belonging to a business group 
is to examine how the pricing of the placements is related to tunneling variables used in the 
previous section. If tunneling takes place from the acquiring (issuing) firm to the issuing (acquiring) 
firm in the same business group, the chaebol firms in intra-group deals are expected to pay 
considerably more (less) to their member issuing firms than firms in other deals. To address this 
issue, in Table X, we use the price discount as the dependent variable and the variables used in 
Table V as the explanatory variables. We find that the coefficient on the interaction term between 
equity ownership by controlling shareholders and the dummy for intra-group deals is negative and 
significant (t-statistic = 2.87) in regression (3), while the coefficient on the dummy for intra-group 
deals is positive albeit insignificant (t-statistic = 1.32). This result suggests that in order to protect 
their interests in issuing firms, the controlling shareholders with larger ownership are less likely to 
sell firms’ securities at a discounted price. An alternative explanation is that these shareholders are 
more likely to engage in a particular type of tunneling activity in which the transfer of resources is 
made from acquirers to issuers.   
[Insert Table  Ⅹ here] 
In regression (4), we find a positive and significant relationship between the price discount and 
an interaction term of industry-adjusted ROA and the dummy for intra-group deals. However, the 
price discount does not have any significant relationship with the dummy for intra-group deals per 
se. These results imply that issuing firms with good past performance are more likely to transfer 
resources from themselves to acquiring firms by selling securities at a discount. The last regression 
shows that our results are mainly driven by the deals in which securities are sold to the chaebol 
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owner-manager. In unreported tests, we also check the factors that determine the pricing of private 
securities separately for the subsample of PEOs and the combined subsample of PCBOs and 
PBWOs. We find that variables that are significant in Table X are also significant for the subsample 
of PEOs. For a combined subsample of PCBOs and PBWOs, the coefficient on the interaction term 
between industry-adjusted ROA and the dummy for intra-group deals is again positive and 
significant with a t-statistic of 4.62, but the coefficient on the interaction term between equity 
ownership by controlling shareholders and the dummy for intra-group deals is not significant (t-
statistic = -1.47). In sum, the results from the pricing of the placements further confirm the 
existence of tunneling in PSOs. 
 
VI. Summary and Conclusion 
Using a comprehensive sample of private placements of securities by Korean firms during the 
period 1989 to 2000, we examine the existence of tunneling within business groups. We document 
that announcement returns for chaebol-issuing firms in intra-group deals are at best close to zero 
and sometimes significantly negative. This contrasts with the evidence on positive and statistically 
significant abnormal returns for private securities issue announcements by U.S. and Japanese firms.   
Further analysis shows that both short- and long-run abnormal returns for chaebol issuers are 
related to the extent of tunneling within member firms. Chaebol issuers with concentrated 
ownership by the controlling shareholders experience significantly lower cumulative abnormal 
returns when they engage in intra-group deals. The result supports the proposition that the 
substantial discretionary power held by controlling shareholders in chaebol firms allows them to 
receive private benefits that do not accrue to other shareholders, resulting in inefficient financing 
decisions. The detrimental effect of controlling ownership is more pronounced when owner-
managers are personally involved in the deals. The abnormal returns for chaebol issuers are also 
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lower when they sell securities at a discount to the firms in the same chaebol, particularly when 
securities are sold to the owner-managers or when issuers perform well before the issue. These 
results again support the view that tunneling is one of the major motivations behind private 
financing activities of the chaebol firms.     
We also examine the abnormal returns for acquirers and non-issuing firms in the same chaebol 
as the issuer and find results that are consistent with the tunneling view. The announcement returns 
for chaebol acquirers are higher when they purchase securities at a discount from affiliated firms 
with good performance. In contrast, well-performing chaebol-affiliated acquirers experience a larger 
wealth loss than other types of acquirers if they buy securities from poorly performing issuers in the 
same chaebol. The regressions for value-weighted portfolio returns of non-issuing firms display a 
similar cross-sectional variation as those for returns of issuers. 
The analysis of the factors that determine the pricing of private placements shows that for deals 
involving issuers and acquirers in the same chaebol, the firms with good past performance tend to 
sell their securities at a low price. 
Our evidence points to a dark side of private securities offerings in Korea that is consistent with 
tunneling within business groups. In recent studies, focusing on investment decisions of group-
affiliated firms, Bertrand et al. (2002) and Bae et al. (2002) examine the existence of tunneling 
within business groups and find evidence that supports its existence. Our findings, coupled with the 
findings of these two papers, suggest that owner-managers in business groups indeed have strong 
incentives to siphon resources out of member firms, and use both investment and financing 
decisions as a means to achieve this goal. Concentrated ownership by chaebol owner-managers and 
cross-shareholding practices within chaebol firms seem to be largely responsible for these distorted 
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1 Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) document a large divergence between cash flow rights and 
control rights for many East Asian firms. Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (1999), La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002), Mitton (2002), Baek, Kang, and Park (2003), and 
Lemmon and Lins (2003) find that firm value is negatively related to the separation of the cash flow 
and control rights of the controlling shareholders. 
 
2 Johnson et al. (2000) show that tunneling can take many different forms. For example, it can take 
an illegal form of outright theft or fraud. It can also take more subtle legal forms, such as transfer 
pricing to benefit controlling shareholders, providing loan guarantees to prop up troubled firms in a 
business group by other listed group members, excessive executive compensation, etc. 
 
3 In another controversial deal, the Samsung Group was also criticized for Samsung Everland’s 
purchase of a 20.7 percent stake in Samsung Life Insurance at the per-share price of a mere 9,000 
won in 1997, compared with the unlisted insurer’s per-share value of over 300,000 won (Korea 
Herald, July 8, 2000). 
 
4  Although chaebol firms have undertaken significant structural reforms to strengthen their 
corporate governance structures in recent years, several important corporate governance systems 
including outside members of the board of directors, external forces such as hostile takeovers and 
proxy contests, and the legal system to protect outside investors, were not well established during 
our sample period. See Bae et al. (2002) and Baek et al. (2003) for a detailed discussion of 
corporate governance systems in Korea.   
 
5 Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002), however, show that the stock market performance of 
U.S. firms issuing private equity is significantly lower than that of non-issuers over a three-year 
period after the offering, and view this as evidence of overoptimistic reactions by investors during 
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the announcement period. Kang, Kim, and Stulz (1999) also document the long-run 
underperformance following private sales of equity by Japanese firms. 
 
6 In a recent paper, Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2003) show that for private placements of 
equity with no public interaction between the issuer and the acquirer, stock returns for issuing firms 
are positive but small at the issue announcement, and negative over 120 days after the offering. 
They argue that these results are consistent with the view that private placements of equity help 
management solidify their control of the firms. While their paper also examines the dark side of 
PSOs by focusing on management entrenchment as a potential motivation behind placing securities 
privately, our focus differs from theirs in that we examine controlling shareholders’ incentives for 
tunneling within firms belonging to business groups. 
 
7 Out of 77 intra-group deals, 34 are sales to the owner-managers and 43 are sales to the firms in the 
same group. 
 
8 As far as the convertible bond price (the price of bonds with warrants) correctly reflects the value 
of the conversion option (warrants value), issuing convertible bonds (bonds with warrants) with the 
conversion (strike) price being set less than the market price should not be a problem. However, if 
the value of the conversion option (warrants value) is not fairly reflected in bond prices and instead 
is set assuming at-the-money (i.e., the conversion (strike) price is the same as the market price), our 
definition of discount will measure potential gains or losses from the purchase of securities. 
 
9 In our regression analyses, we also experiment with White’s heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard 
errors in computing t-statistics and obtain results that are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
the paper. 
 
10 In an unreported test, we also experiment with a combined sample of convertible and warrant 
bond issues and obtain results similar to those reported here. 
 31 
Table I 
Distribution of Private Placements of Securities by Year and by Type of Securities 
 
The sample consists of private sales of equity-linked securities by nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) 
during the period 1989 to 2000. The sample is obtained by checking various sources, including the Korea Securities Research 
Institute’s database, the Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA)’s database, the KLCA’s monthly publication, Sang Jang, 
KOSCOM’s CHECK2000 database, and the KSE’s Korea Investor’s Network for Disclosure System. To avoid having results 
confounded by multiple issues that cluster during a short time period, issues that occur within a 10-day interval before and after 
the announcement of the offering are eliminated. Intra-group deals refer to private sales of equity-linked securities to acquirers in 
the same chaebol. A chaebol refers to a business group that has at least two listed member firms. The numbers in the private 
offerings columns represent sample observations in each category. The numbers in the rights offerings and IPOs columns 
represent the total number of rights offerings and initial public offerings, respectively. KOSPI returns are the annual returns of the 
Korea Composite Stock Price Index.   















offerings  IPOs 
KOSPI 
returns 
1989 1  0  0  1  0  1  155  124 0.30% 
1990 0  10  0  10  1  9  126  43 -23.50% 
1991 1  30  0  31  1  30  124  22 -12.20% 
1992 0  13  0  13  2  11  112  4  11.00% 
1993 1  0  0  1  1  0  162  8  27.70% 
1994 2  0  0  2  0  2  106  31 18.60% 
1995 3  0  0  3  2  1  142  28 -14.10% 
1996 2  0  0  2  2  0  106  51 -26.20% 
1997 2  40  21  63  26  37  84  23 -42.20% 
1998 17  24  2  44  21  23  79  3  49.50% 
1999 16  26  30  72  13  59  162  31  82.80% 
2000 15  6  0  21  6  15  86  4  -52.35% 





Sample Characteristics of Private Placements of Securities by Involvement of Group-affiliated Acquiring Firms in the Deals and by Type of Securities 
 
The sample consists of private sales of equity-linked securities by nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) during the period 1989 to 2000. The 
sample is obtained by checking various sources, including the Korea Securities Research Institute’s database, the Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA)’s 
database, the KLCA’s monthly publication, Sang Jang, KOSCOM’s CHECK2000 database, and the KSE’s Korea Investor’s Network for Disclosure System. To avoid 
having results confounded by multiple issues that cluster during a short time period, issues that occur within a 10-day interval before and after the announcement of the 
offering are eliminated. Intra-group deals refer to private sales of equity-linked securities to acquirers in the same chaebol. A chaebol is a business group that has at least 
two listed member firms. For private sales of equity, the discount is calculated as the ratio of the difference between the share price on the announcement date and the 
offer price to share price on the announcement date. For convertible bonds and bonds with warrants, the conversion price and the exercise price are used instead of the 
offer price, respectively. Equity ownership by the controlling shareholder includes ownership by the largest shareholder, her/his family members, and affiliated firms. 
The mean is reported on top and the median is reported in square brackets. Bold numbers are used for the cases where there are significant differences in the mean 
(median) between intra-group deals and other deals based on the t-test (Wilcoxon z-test) at the 0.05 level or lower.   
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Equity ownership by the 




















































Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Issuing Firms around the Announcement Date 
 
The sample consists of private sales of equity-linked securities by nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange 
during the period 1989 to 2000. We obtain the initial public announcement date of the issue from the Korea Economic 
Daily, a publication that is essentially the Korean equivalent of the Wall Street Journal. We compute abnormal returns 
using the market model. We estimate the market model by using 200 trading days of return data ending 20 days before the 
issue announcement. We use the Korea Composite Stock Price Index return as the benchmark. The daily abnormal return 
is accumulated to obtain the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from day -t before the announcement date to day +t after 
the announcement date. Intra-group deals refer to private sales of equity-linked securities to acquirers in the same chaebol. 
A chaebol is a business group that has at least two listed member firms. The mean is reported on top and the median is 
reported in square brackets. All returns are in percentages. The numbers in the test-of-difference rows are p-values for the 
test where the mean/median is equal for issuers in intra-group deals and those in other deals. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance of the parameter estimates at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
  Sample 
size  CAR (-1,1)  CAR (-5,5)  CAR (-10.480) 








































































































































Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Purchasing Firms and Non-issuing Portfolios around the Announcement Date   
 
The sample of purchasing firms consists of nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) that purchase 
the largest portion of equity-linked securities during the period 1989 to 2000. The sample of non-issuing portfolios 
consists of nonfinancial firms listed on the KSE that are not involved in private sales of equity-linked securities, but 
belong to the same group as the issuers. We obtain the initial public announcement date of the issue from the Korea 
Economic Daily, a publication that is essentially the Korean equivalent of the Wall Street Journal. We compute abnormal 
returns for purchasing firms using the market model. We estimate the market model by using 200 trading days of return 
data ending 20 days before the issue announcement. We use the Korea Composite Stock Price Index return as the 
benchmark. The daily abnormal return is accumulated to obtain the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from day -t before 
the announcement date to day +t after the announcement date. We estimate abnormal returns for non-issuing affiliates 
using the portfolio approach. We estimate the market-model parameters using the return of the value-weighted portfolio of 
non-issuing firms in the same group. We then estimate the daily abnormal returns of the portfolio using the market model 
parameters and accumulate the daily abnormal returns to obtain the portfolio CAR from day -t to day +t. Intra-group deals 
refer to private sales of equity-linked securities to acquirers in the same chaebol. A chaebol is a business group that has at 
least two listed member firms. The mean is reported on top and the median is reported in square brackets. All returns are 
in percentages. The numbers in the test-of-difference columns are p-values for the test where the mean/median is equal for 
firms in intra-group deals and those in other deals. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the parameter estimates at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: CARs by the type of securities 
  Sample 
size  CAR (-1, 1)  CAR (-5, 5)  CAR (-10,480) 

































[-40.16]***  Convertible  
Bonds  Non-issuing 











[-12.37]  Bonds 
with 
Warrants  Non-issuing 







Panel B: CARs (-1, 1) by intra-group deals 
Purchasing firm    Issuing firm  Test of difference 
(A-B) 

























[0.62]**  0.469 0.411  0.069  0.253 
Sample  size  31 39 31 39      
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Table V 
Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns [CAR (-1, 1)] for Issuers on Issue and Issuer Characteristics   
 
The sample consists of private sales of equity-linked securities by nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange 
during the period 1989 to 2000. We compute abnormal returns using the market model. We estimate the market model by 
using 200 trading days of return data ending 20 days before the issue announcement. We use the Korea Composite Stock 
Price Index return as the benchmark. Equity ownership by the controlling shareholder includes ownership by the largest 
shareholder, her/his family members, and affiliated firms. For private sales of equity, the discount is calculated as the ratio 
of the difference between the share price on the announcement date and the offer price to share price on the 
announcement date. For convertible bonds and bonds with warrants, the conversion price and the exercise price are used 
instead of the offer price, respectively. Intra-group deals refer to private sales of equity-linked securities to acquirers in the 
same chaebol. A chaebol is a business group that has at least two listed member firms. t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the parameter estimates at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively.  
    (1)    (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 














Equity ownership by the controlling     

















































(0.47)    0.019 
(0.25) 
Equity ownership by the controlling   
    shareholder is above the median   
  (dummy):  (C) 
     0.016 
(1.13)    
Industry-adjusted ROA is above the   
  median  (dummy):  (D)        -0.004 
(-0.32)   
Securities are sold to the owner- 
    manager or firm in the same chaebol   












(-0.31)   
Securities are sold to the owner- 
    manager in the chaebol (dummy): (F)         0.015 
(0.55) 
Securities are sold to the firm in the same 
  chaebol  (dummy):  (G)         0.028 
(1.03) 
(A) × (E)     -0.186** 
(-2.05) 
-0.214** 
(-2.35)     
(B) × (E)      -0.037* 
(-1.95)     
(B) × (C) × (E)       -0.035** 
(-2.02)    
(B) × (D) × (E)        -0.218** 
(-2.29)   
(A) × (F)         -0.236** 
(-2.10) 
(B) × (F)         -0.061*** 
(-3.21) 
(A) × (G)         -0.086 
(-0.79) 
(B) × (G)         0.001 
(0.06) 




































Type of securities (dummies)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.035 0.073 0.086 0.096 0.086 0.090 0.121 
F-value  2.04 2.65 2.81 2.91 2.82 2.91 2.92 
No. of observations  261 252 252 252 252 252 238 
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 Table  VI 
Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns [CAR (-1, 1)] for Issuers on Issue and Issuer Characteristics by Type 
of Securities   
The sample consists of private sales of equity and convertible bonds by nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Stock 
Exchange during the period 1989 to 2000. We compute abnormal returns using the market model. We estimate the market 
model by using 200 trading days of return data ending 20 days before the issue announcement. We use the Korea 
Composite Stock Price Index return as the benchmark. Equity ownership by the controlling shareholder includes 
ownership by the largest shareholder, her/his family members, and affiliated firms. For private sales of equity, the 
discount is calculated as the ratio of the difference between the share price on the announcement date and the offer price 
to share price on the announcement date. For convertible bonds, the conversion price is used instead of the offer price. 
Intra-group deals refer to private sales of equity-linked securities to acquirers in the same chaebol. A chaebol is a business 
group that has at least two listed member firms. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance of the parameter estimates at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
Equity issues  Convertible bond issues       ( 1 )        ( 2 )       ( 3 )        ( 4 )     ( 1 )        ( 2 )       ( 3 )       ( 4 )  
















Equity ownership by the   
  controlling  shareholder:  (A) 
-0.249 

























Equity ownership by   

















Industry-adjusted ROA    -0.175 
(-1.13) 
-0.152 





(1.21)    0.123 
(1.22) 
Equity ownership by the   
  controlling  shareholder  is  
    above the median (dummy): (C) 
  -0.018 
(-0.64)       0.025 
(1.28)    
Industry-adjusted ROA is   
    above the median (dummy): (D)     -0.021 
(-0.64)       0.013 
(0.78)   
Securities are sold to the owner- 
    manager or firm in the same 
    chaebol (dummy for intra-group 











(-0.20)   
Securities are sold to the owner- 
    manager in the chaebol   
  (dummy):  (F) 
     -0.034 
(-0.65)      0.044 
(1.07) 
Securities are sold to the firm in 
the same chaebol (dummy): (G)       0.045 
(0.79)      0.028 
(0.77) 
(A) × (E)  0.175 
(0.99)       -0.375*** 
(-2.77)      
(B) × (E)  -0.048* 
(-1.83)       0.010 
(0.27) 
)
    
(B) × (C) × (E)    -0.054** 
(-2.08)       -0.011 
(-0.32)    
(B) × (D) × (E)     -0.095 
(-0.54)       -0.393*** 
(-2.83)   
(A) × (F)       0.074 
(0.46)      -0.609*** 
(-2.85) 
(B) × (F)       -0.053** 
(-2.31)      -0.080 
(-0.83) 
(A) × (G)       0.105 
(0.58)      -0.150 
(-0.96) 
(B) × (G)       -0026 
(-0.46)      0.036 
(0.98) 

















































Industry dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.261 0.223  0.208  0.306 0.046 0.000 0.051  0.089 
F-value  2.68 2.49  2.37  3.32 1.64 0.84 1.78  1.98 
No. of observations  58 58  58  54 146  146  143  141 
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Table VII 
Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns [CAR (-1, 1)] for Acquirers on Issuer and Acquirer Characteristics 
The sample consists of nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange that purchase the largest portion of equity-
linked securities during the period 1989 to 2000. We compute abnormal returns using the market model. We estimate the 
market model by using 200 trading days of return data ending 20 days before the issue announcement. We use the Korea 
Composite Stock Price Index return as the benchmark. Equity ownership by the controlling shareholder includes 
ownership by the largest shareholder, her/his family members, and affiliated firms. For private sales of equity, the 
discount is calculated as the ratio of the difference between the share price on the announcement date and the offer price 
to share price on the announcement date. For convertible bonds and bonds with warrants, the conversion price and the 
exercise price are used instead of the offer price, respectively. The bad issuer / good acquirer dummy takes a value of one 
if the issuer’s industry-adjusted ROA is below the sample median, the acquirer’s industry-adjusted ROA is above the 
sample median, and the issuer and acquirer are within the same chaebol. A chaebol is a business group that has at least 
two listed member firms. t-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the parameter estimates 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Issuer/issue characteristics:        
Equity ownership by the controlling shareholder: (A)  0.183** 




















Industry-adjusted ROA    0.290*** 
(3.22) 
0.278*** 
(2.92)    
Equity ownership by the controlling shareholder is above   
    the median (dummy): (C)    0.027 
(1.24)    
Industry-adjusted ROA is above the median   
  dummy):  (D)     0.270*** 
(2.91)   
Securities are sold to the firm in the same chaebol 









Bad issuer / good acquirer dummy: (F)        0.052 
(0.98) 
(A) × (E)  -0.105 
(-0.65)     
(B) × (E)  -0.129*** 
(-3.07)     
(B) × (C) × (E)    -0.083** 
(-2.16)    
(B) × (D) × (E)     0.250** 
(2.05)   
(E) × (F)       -0.119* 
(-1.86) 

























Type of securities (dummies)  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Acquirer characteristics:        
Industry-adjusted ROA    -0.064 
(-0.50) 
-0.068 
(-0.47)    

























2  0.374 0.307  0.328  0.214 
F-value  3.43 2.92  2.99  2.25 
No. of observations  70 70  70  70 
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Table VIII 
Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns [CAR (-1, 1)] for the Portfolio of Non-issuing Firms on Issuer 
Characteristics 
 
The sample of the portfolio of non-issuing firms consists of nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange that 
are not involved in private sales of equity-linked securities, but belong to the same group as the issuers. We estimate 
abnormal returns for non-issuing affiliates using the portfolio approach. We estimate the market-model parameters using 
the return of the value-weighted portfolio of non-issuing firms in the same group. We estimate the market model by using 
200 trading days of portfolio return data ending 20 days before the issue announcement. We use the Korea Composite 
Stock Price Index return as the benchmark. Equity ownership by the controlling shareholder includes ownership by the 
largest shareholder, her/his family members, and affiliated firms. For private sales of equity, the discount is calculated as 
the ratio of the difference between the share price on the announcement date and the offer price to share price on the 
announcement date. For convertible bonds and bonds with warrants, the conversion price and the exercise price are used 
instead of the offer price, respectively. Intra-group deals refer to private sale of equity-linked securities to acquirers in the 
same chaebol. A chaebol is a business group that has at least two listed member firms. t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the parameter estimates at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively.  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 














Equity ownership by the controlling     

















































(-0.92)    0.085 
(0.59) 
Equity ownership by the controlling   
    shareholder is above the median   
  (dummy):  (C) 
      -0.013 
(-1.25)    
Industry-adjusted ROA is above the   
  median  (dummy):  (D)          0.009 
(0.84)   
Securities are sold to the owner- 
    manager or firm in the same chaebol 












(-1.09)   
Securities are sold to the owner- 
    manager in the chaebol   
  (dummy):  (F) 
          0.065 
(0.87) 
Securities are sold to the firm in the   
    same chaebol (dummy): (G)            -0.008 
(-0.33) 
(A) × (E)     -0.020 
(-1.03) 
-0.019 
(-1.03)      
(B) × (E)      -0.069 
(-0.62)      
(B) × (C) × (E)        0.002 
(0.11)    
(B) × (D) × (E)          -0.115*** 
(-2.71)   
(A) × (F)            -0.529 
(-0.94) 
(B) × (F)            -0.148** 
(-2.32) 
(A) × (G)            0.121 
(0.88) 
(B) × (G)            -0.010 
(-0.57) 





































Type of securities (dummies)  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.096 0.138 0.139  0.133  0.091  0.199 0.248 
F-value  2.17 2.32 2.23  2.08  1.77  2.91 2.77 




Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns [CAR (-10, 480)] for Issuers on Issue and Issuer Characteristics   
 
The sample consists of private sales of equity-linked securities by nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange 
during the period 1989 to 2000. We compute abnormal returns using the market model. We estimate the market model by 
using 200 trading days of return data ending 20 days before the issue announcement. We use the Korea Composite Stock 
Price Index return as the benchmark. Equity ownership by the controlling shareholder includes ownership by the largest 
shareholder, her/his family members, and affiliated firms. For private sales of equity, the discount is calculated as the ratio 
of the difference between the share price on the announcement date and the offer price to share price on the 
announcement date. For convertible bonds and bonds with warrants, the conversion price and the exercise price are used 
instead of the offer price, respectively. Intra-group deals refer to private sales of equity-linked securities to acquirers in the 
same chaebol. A chaebol is a business group that has at least two listed member firms. t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the parameter estimates at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively.  
   (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 














Equity ownership by the controlling     

















































(-1.20)    -2.236 
(-1.26) 
Equity ownership by the controlling   
    shareholder is above the median   
  (dummy):  (C) 
     2.261 
(1.39)    
Industry-adjusted ROA is above the   
  median  (dummy):  (D)        0.053 
(0.31)   
Securities are sold to the owner- 
    manager or firm in the same chaebol   












(-1.14)   
Securities are sold to the owner- 
    manager in the chaebol (dummy): (F)         0.244 
(0.67) 
Securities are sold to the firm in the same 
  chaebol  (dummy):  (G)         0.368 
(1.00) 
(A) × (E)     -2.181* 
(-1.84) 
-2.339** 
(-2.01)     
(B) × (E)      -0.916*** 
(-2.91)     
(B) × (C) × (E)       -0.047 
(-1.46)    
(B) × (D) × (E)        -2.656** 
(-2.11)   
(A) × (F)         -3.359** 
(-2.24) 
(B) × (F)         -1.702*** 
(-2.76) 
(A) × (G)         -1.039 
(-0.71) 
(B) × (G)         -0.802*** 
(-2.66) 




































Type of securities (dummies)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.159 0.173 0.181 0.207 0.159 0.178 0.270 
F-value  6.32 5.26 5.17 5.56 4.57 5.08 6.01 
No. of observations  254 245 245 245 245 245 231 
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Table X 
Regression of the Price Discount on Issue and Issuer Characteristics   
 
The sample consists of private sales of equity-linked securities by nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange 
during the period 1989 to 2000. For private sales of equity, the discount is calculated as the ratio of the difference between 
the share price on the announcement date and the offer price to share price on the announcement date. For convertible 
bonds and bonds with warrants, the conversion price and the exercise price are used instead of the offer price, respectively. 
Equity ownership by the controlling shareholder includes ownership by the largest shareholder, her/his family members, 
and affiliated firms. Intra-group deals refer to private sales of equity-linked securities to acquirers in the same chaebol. A 
chaebol is a business group that has at least two listed member firms. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 
denote the significance of the parameter estimates at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
   (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












Equity ownership by the controlling   





































Securities are sold to the owner-manager   
    or firm in the same chaebol (dummy   










(2.04)   
Securities are sold to the owner-manager   
    in the chaebol (dummy): (D)          0.562*** 
(2.67) 
Securities are sold to the firm in the   
    same chaebol (dummy): (E)          0.071 
(0.32) 
(A) × (C)     -1.846*** 
(-2.87)    -2.024*** 
(-3.21)   
(B) × (C)      4.075*** 
(3.18) 
4.402*** 
(3.49)   
(A) × (D)          -3.390*** 
(-4.12) 
(B) × (D)          2.395** 
(2.21) 
(A) × (E)          -0.321 
(-0.38) 
(B) × (E)          4.561*** 
(3.23) 






























Type of securities (dummies)  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.076 0.085 0.112  0.119  0.151  0.191 
F-value  3.68 3.12 3.63  3.81  4.45  5.02 




The sample comprises 262 nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange between 1989 and 2000. We obtain the initial public announcement date of the 
issues from the Korea Economic Daily. We compute abnormal returns using the market model. We estimate the market model by using 200 trading days of return data 
ending 20 days before the issue announcement. We use the Korea Composite Stock Price Index return as the benchmark. Intra-group deals refer to private sales of 
equity-linked securities to acquirers in the same business group that has at least two listed member firms. Other deals refer to those that are not intra-group deals. 
Figure 1. Cumulative Abnormal Returns from Day -10 to Day +480 around the Issue Announcement 